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21. Troubling tax havens: multi-
jurisdictional arbitrage and corporate tax
footprint reduction
Ronen Palan and Giovanni Mangraviti
INTRODUCTION
It is well known among tax experts that corporate tax planning schemes 
are typically organized through a multitude of jurisdictions (Western 
et  al., 2011; Palan, 2014a). Companies, large and small, are normally 
seen as unitary entities. They are referred to by their trademark names – 
Google, Amazon, IBM, British Telecom, BMW or Toyota, and so on – 
and are commonly thought of as American, British, German or Japanese, 
as the case may be. In reality, the vast majority of such companies consist 
of a multitude of companies, veritable ecologies in some cases, typically 
numbering in the hundreds or even thousands. Goldman Sachs, a dual 
entity combining a bank holding company (BHC) with a financial holding 
company (FHC), consists of 3115 separate legal entities, 1670 of which 
are registered outside the USA. JPMorgan Chase and Co, another BHC, 
consists of 3389 separate legal units, 451 of which are registered outside 
the USA (Avraham et al., 2012). BP, supposedly a British company,1 
consists of 1180 affiliates in 84 countries going 12 tiers deep (that is, 12 
tiers of affiliates holding other affiliates and so on) (OpenOil, 2014). They 
are registered in various jurisdictions, among which notable tax havens, 
such as the Cayman Islands, British Virgin Islands, Jersey, Ireland, the 
Netherlands or Luxembourg, feature heavily.
Within these ecologies, each corporate structure provides its own con-
tribution, as it were, to the tax planning scheme of the parent company, 
insofar as it brings with it a unique bundle of corporate tax laws and regu-
lations that are particular to the jurisdiction of its location. Considered 
in isolation, entities of this sort may appear innocuous. It is only when 
intertwined with other entities of different jurisdictions that such schemes 
reveal their true purpose – that is, the exploitation of jurisdictional arbi-
trage for the purposes of minimizing individual and corporate tax foot-
prints. The exploitation of jurisdictional arbitrage under such schemes 
may be blatant, but is hardly conspicuous. The industrial complex built 
around the business of selling tax minimization strategies is contingent as 
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well as dependent upon a thick welter of intertwined jurisdictions where 
arbitrage schemes can grow and proliferate out of sight.
To investigate the nature and mechanisms of tax arbitrage, this chapter 
explores the linkages between wealth and multi- jurisdictionality: how 
and why the corporate world operates as a set of global business ecolo-
gies on top of an undergrowth of jurisdictional networks. We start with a 
brief discussion of the concept of wealth. Our analysis will proceed from 
the premise that the lion’s share of global wealth is in fact ‘intangible’. 
Distinguishing between tangible and intangible wealth is crucial to operat-
ing another important analytical distinction at the level of tax reduction 
and wealth: that between tax minimization schemes aimed at accumulated 
wealth, or ‘wealth- already- accumulated’, and those aimed at accumulating 
wealth, or ‘wealth- to- be- accumulated’. The opaque relationship between 
tax minimization schemes and wealth accumulation is at the heart of what 
makes tax havens just so troublesome.
TROUBLESOME WEALTH AND TAX HAVENS
Troublesome wealth is, perhaps ironically, ‘protected’ wealth. As the 
principal strategy of wealth protection, the otherwise mundane activity 
of individual and corporate tax planning has become the kingpin of the 
most extraordinarily opaque system of wealth transfer in the world. The 
bulk of this system of wealth protection is aimed at escaping the clutches 
of public fiscal authorities. In a world with no common tax rules, the busi-
ness of protecting, or otherwise concealing wealth plays out mostly via 
clever strategies of capital transfers: complex international transactions 
can elude tax supervision through a complex maze of legal trap doors and 
escape hatches, to the point where the difference between avoidance and 
evasion – guile and crime – becomes all but immaterial.
In pursuance of either elusive or avoidant tax planning, the bulk of this 
enormous traffic of wealth takes place in and out of special tax zones – 
that is, tax havens (Palan et al., 2010; Henry, 2012; Stewart, 2012; The 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2013). Also referred to as 
‘offshore financial centres’ by their professionals, or ‘secrecy jurisdictions’ 
by their detractors, tax havens are sovereign states or suzerain jurisdictions 
that offer international capital a system of eased tax regimes in direct com-
petition with the regulatory provisions of other states. They can be defined 
broadly as ‘any jurisdiction that satisfies two criteria. First, it has tax laws 
that are attractive to global investors and entrepreneurs. Second, it protects 
its fiscal sovereignty by choosing, in at least some cases, not to enforce 
the bad tax laws of other nations’ (Mitchell, 2009). With the  progressive 
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expansion of state expenditure as well as state coffers across most advanced 
industrialized countries over the past century, the minimization of both 
individual and corporate tax footprint has become an expanding and lucra-
tive business. Albeit an important strategy of financial growth and global 
competition, this industrial complex is less subservient to the economic 
interests of tax havens themselves than to those of the larger community 
of resident and non- resident accountants, lawyers, bankers, financiers 
and businesses who purchase the protection of offshore  jurisdictions – 
 essentially legal sovereignty – for the purposes of tax arbitrage.
There are many ways the super- rich can avail themselves of tax havens.2 
Perhaps the easiest one, for both individual and businesses, is to establish 
an offshore trust or foundation. Exempt from registration in most juris-
dictions, trusts separate the beneficiary of an asset from a trustee, often an 
offshore legal owner, who is assigned fiduciary duty to manage the asset 
for the benefit of the former. Alternatively, businesses, and increasingly 
also international financial institutions, can also establish a subsidiary, 
affiliate or independent company directly in a tax haven. Often set up 
as limited liability companies, or international business corporations 
(IBCs), these subsidiaries are employed to store profitable capital, trade 
in financial markets, hold property rights and manage investment funds in 
complete anonymity with respect to the parent company, whose transac-
tions with subsidiaries are concealed under the company’s ‘consolidated’ 
accounts. Aside from transferring capital to one of the above- mentioned 
offshore instruments, individuals have also the option of relocating their 
domicile or non- domiciled residency to a tax haven, or more drastically, 
renouncing both domicile and residency to live as PTs, or ‘permanent 
tourists’ exempt from tax and other legal obligations (Maurer, 1998). The 
basic principle of both individual and business tax planning is to spread 
one’s assets across a multitude of jurisdictions so that most profit and 
capital transfers disappear from the tax radar.
The beneficiaries of these offshore tax- planning schemes are the global 
elite. The super- rich, in particular, hold the rough equivalent of the US 
annual GDP parked in offshore jurisdictions in direct competition with 
public fiscal authorities (Henry, 2012). The withdrawal of the product and 
the process of wealth accumulation from both fiscal and legal supervision 
spells trouble all round. Not only do tax minimization schemes clear the 
way for money laundering and other illegal activities, but they also skew 
the global distribution of income to the detriment of those individuals 
and businesses who lack the financial wherewithal, or moral proclivity, 
to engage in offshore tax minimization schemes. As will be explained 
below, what makes such schemes particularly troublesome for the distri-
bution of global wealth is that the intangible nature of most assets makes 
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 multi- jurisdictional tax arbitrage an instrument of wealth creation as 
much as of wealth concealment (Beaverstock et al., 2013).
WEALTH PROTECTION AND INTANGIBLE 
WEALTH
The concept of aggregate global household wealth, despite a long intellec-
tual heritage, has generated surprisingly little interest among economists.3 
The focus of most writing in political economy falls on GDP trends, often 
treated as growth projections, as well as debt, trade data or even income 
distribution. Wealth accumulation, one of the primary objectives of most 
civilizations, seems to play a curiously small role in mainstream under-
standings of political economy.
This attitude is changing. Since 2009, the Swiss bank Credit Suisse 
began issuing trend reports on the direction of global aggregate wealth. 
Its latest report, Global Wealth 2013, suggests that aggregated household 
wealth in 2013 stood at US$242 trillion, approximately three times the 
world’s annual GDP (Keating et al., 2013). Credit Suisse additionally goes 
on to estimate a 40 per cent rise in global wealth over the course of the 
next five years. That figure is extraordinarily out of kilter with the current 
estimates of growth in the world economy, which most economists predict 
will rise very modestly over the same period.4 What accounts for such a 
widening gap between global wealth and global growth?
Behind this apparent contradiction is a fundamental accounting magic. 
Economists tend to identify household wealth with ‘tangibles’, such as 
stock holding and real estate, in contrast to what they consider ‘intan-
gibles’, such as human capital. Data on household wealth are typically 
referred to as ‘net household wealth’ and, accordingly, wealthy individu-
als are known as ‘high net worth individuals’ (HNWIs). The prefix ‘net’, 
here, is conventionally understood to refer to assets minus liabilities. But 
there is another element that distinguishes estimates of individual net 
worth from those of corporate ‘net worth’. Whereas corporate accounts 
include the category of ‘goodwill’, individual ones do not. The assumption 
is that individuals ‘own’ two types of properties: ‘tangible’ properties (e.g., 
shares, real estate, yachts, art), and ‘intangible’ properties, also known 
as ‘goodwill’. Wealth data generally only account for net assets – that is, 
accumulated wealth, as opposed to intangible assets.
The notion of goodwill and intangible assets is best understood in con-
nection with the concept of ‘futurity’ (Palan, 2012, 2014b). The term, 
in John R. Commons’s original reformulation of Böhm- Bawerk and 
MacLeod’s definitions of futurity value, refers to a nineteenth- century 
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legal innovation that marked a watershed in the development of capital-
ist institutions in the West (Commons [1924] 1959; 1961). The idea of 
futurity, with its particular understanding of valuation, is the keystone 
concept that holds together the notions of wealth- already- accumulated 
and wealth- to- be- accumulated.
Historically, businesses were valued on the basis of two modes of valu-
ations. One was based on replacement value, equal to the current market 
prices of a firm’s assets, and the other was based on liquidation value, 
which amounts to the value of a firm’s assets upon cessation of business. 
In both cases, valuation is backward looking, in the sense that it reflects 
past business records and temporarily assumes the present company to 
have ceased operations. These valuations represent the power of credi-
tors, who are seeking solid securities for their investment. Yet, businesses 
are not set up to fail; they are set up to capture future income streams. A 
different mode of valuation was therefore developed in the late nineteenth 
century, primarily in the USA, to better capture this reality. This mode was 
modelled after the principle of goodwill. In this view, firms are considered 
organic and future- oriented entities that only stand for what businesses 
are ultimately after: claims on future income streams. Accordingly, firms 
are treated as ‘going concerns’ (i.e., institutional complexes embedded in 
time and invested in the future). The pervasiveness of increasingly highly 
valued goodwill, notably in the case of big corporations such as the Coca- 
Cola Company, is testament to the fact that futurity, as a forward- looking 
mode of valuation, is truer to the everyday logic of business enterprises 
and particularly suited to explain the relationship between intangible 
wealth- already- accumulated (e.g., goodwill) and tangible wealth- to- be- 
accumulated (e.g., future income).
This distinction is of particular importance when investigating the 
dynamics between wealth accumulation and tax planning. In the business 
of wealth protection, intangible assets often call for special treatment. 
While some wealth schemes are primarily intended to protect wealth 
already accumulated, generally referred to as ‘net household wealth’, 
others are intended to protect future or potential income- generating titles. 
The academic literature on the subject seems long on the former and short 
on the latter. Protection schemes for future or potential income are usually 
only mentioned in the context of what are described in the trade as ‘sophis-
ticated’ schemes, where the objectives of both types of wealth protection 
are mixed together.
The intangible dimension of wealth looms even larger. That is because 
conventional classifications of tangible and intangible assets are conceptu-
ally misleading. A number of tangible assets commonly conceived as part 
of wealth- already- accumulated, such as stock, shares and even bonds, 
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contain in fact an inherent degree of futurity value. As noted in a different 
context (Palan, 2014b), even the seemingly tangible assets of real estate 
are regularly valued as claims on future income streams. In other words, 
the current value of those assets factors in future profits. As their value 
is based largely on projections of future profits, those seemingly tangi-
ble assets would deserve inclusion in corporate accounts as part of their 
goodwill.
Contrary to common impression, therefore, it is reasonable to conclude 
that most ‘wealth’ is made up of non- tangible assets that represent claims 
on future income streams. However, by their intangible nature, claims on 
future income streams are nomadic, and their place of registration – and 
taxation – is easy to manipulate.
Goodwill and Tax Havens
Let us briefly consider goodwill management with reference to individual 
wealth. There is little doubt that a renowned footballer of the likes of 
David Beckham, for instance, will have accumulated a great stock of 
wealth in his lifetime on the back of his many professional achievements.5 
What is often neglected, however, is that his profile and visibility will have 
also earned him a commensurate amount of goodwill among the public. 
Though intangible, goodwill is a considerable addition to the footballer’s 
personal wealth because, as promise of future profit, it constitutes an asset 
for sale. Commercial establishments will seek to obtain this asset – his 
‘endorsement’ in this context – in order to associate his goodwill to their 
products, thereby attracting potential customers and increasing sales. 
Companies are therefore prepared to purchase Beckham’s goodwill at a 
price. They purchase the right to use his image, or words attributed to him 
(both under strict conditions), to endorse their products. David Beckham, 
to pursue the example further, can therefore be said to be in the business 
of selling his goodwill, which he can also do to more than one company at 
a time. There are a few restrictions: for example, he may only be allowed 
to support, say, one brand of fizzy drink at any one time. That is because 
a goodwill persona is for all intents and purposes a business proposition 
and, as such, goes by a different set of rules to the person itself. In our 
example, ‘goodwill Beckham’ is not allowed to indulge in both Coca- Cola 
and Pepsi at the same time, whereas ‘real Beckham’ may well enjoy both 
(or neither).
This intangible side to personal wealth lays itself wide open to tax 
minimization schemes. Spotting an opportunity in the management of 
celebrity goodwill, for instance, the island of Guernsey has recently intro-
duced a new law, the Image Rights (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Ordinance 
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(States of Guernsey, 2012), which enables the registration of personalities 
and images associated to them. The advantage of a Guernsey registra-
tion is twofold. First, as a UK jurisdiction, Guernsey can project its laws 
overseas and hence ensure (to an as yet untested degree) the maintenance 
of such rights throughout the world. Second, Guernsey corporate taxa-
tion is 20 per cent as opposed to the 50 per cent that top earners, such as 
David Beckham, would pay in the UK. Hence, by the simple provision of 
registering image rights in Guernsey, a well- known celebrity can already 
reduce tax liabilities to 20 per cent. As we will see later, that 20 per cent can 
be chipped further away.
Celebrities like David Beckham (and Sean ‘Diddy’ Combs as discussed 
by Watson in Chapter 9 in this volume) are not alone is selling their good-
will; in principle, we all do. When academic lecturers, such as the authors of 
this chapter, sign a contract with a university, the university is purchasing 
something about the future accomplishment and services of said academics, 
typically based on projections of past performances. In that sense, not only 
do we all ‘own’ something that may generate future income, but the potential 
for future income may also be valuable in itself. Insofar as both sides to the 
contract make promises to the future, these contracts are essentially futures.
What mainstream accounts of ‘net household wealth’ or HNWI leave 
out of their calculations, however, are two variables: (1) estimates of 
aggregate potential earnings accruing from individual goodwill, and (2) 
potential for future gains that may or may not materialize. These items 
are usually missing from data logs on HNWI because they are scarcely 
employed for the purposes of traditional accounting. In practice, however, 
these intangible variables make a considerable difference in future- 
sensitive contexts. For example, they are playing an increasing role in 
divorce proceedings, especially of celebrities and the super- rich, who may 
be ordered to award former spouses a ‘percentage ownership interest in 
the future income stream [generated from] professional goodwill’ in the 
interest of equitable distribution.6 This analysis therefore alerts us to the 
existence of three types of personal wealth:
● wealth that has already been accumulated;
● income streams generated against personal goodwill; and
● future income streams that may be generated against personal 
goodwill.
Real Estate and Tax Havens
That most wealth is largely intangible, and hence nomadic, may appear 
counterintuitive. Let us take the example of what has a good claim to be 
HAY & BEANSTOCK PRINT.indd   428 13/11/2015   10:32
Troubling tax havens   429
the least mobile of assets, real estate – also known, appropriately enough, 
as ‘immovable property’. The vast majority of household ‘net’ wealth is 
residential and commercial real estate, which is subject to various layers of 
taxation during the ownership cycle as well as at point of sale. There is a 
business case, therefore, to find ways of grabbing income from real estate 
without the claiming direct ownership. Different tax planning strategies 
can be used to achieve this, such as through financial derivatives (which 
cannot be explored at sufficient length here) or through schemes that 
prevent the registration of the sales of real estate in a taxing country. In 
all these cases, multi- jurisdictional arrangements are necessary, preferably 
through tax havens.
Let us take the example of a London property. In the UK, realized 
appreciation in the value of properties is subject to capital gains tax, cur-
rently standing at 18 per cent. In addition, the UK imposes a 7 per cent 
stamp duty on purchase of assets worth more than £2 million (risen to 
12 per cent in late 2014), the value of a small flat in central London. The 
figure for properties owned by companies goes up to 15 per cent. Duties 
on the sales of such properties can therefore reach up to 33 per cent of the 
value of the sale. How can taxes be avoided on such sales? These are, after 
all, immobile assets.
Let us considered the following scenario:
1. London Property A is owned by a Spanish Company B. Company B 
has only one asset, the London property.
2. Company B is owned by Company C, registered in the Cayman 
Islands.
3. Company C is owned by Company D, registered in Bermuda.
4. A legal person wishes to purchase London property A. To do so, they 
set up a company in Luxembourg (Company E).
The scheme can work in a number of ways. For instance, Company C 
sells Company B to Company E registered in Luxembourg. Alternatively, 
Company D sells Company C to Company E. In both of these cases, as 
far as the UK is concerned, no sale took place: Property A is still owned 
by company B, and hence there are no tax issues arising from this sale. 
Taxation on sales of companies in the Cayman Islands or Bermuda is 
minimal. In fact, the sale may have no tax implications at all (known in the 
trade as ‘tax neutral’ transaction).
At face value, each company in the above scenario appears innoc-
uous; these are entirely legitimate Spanish, Cayman, Bermudan and 
Luxembourgian companies. Furthermore, in this scenario, each of the 
jurisdictions may even pride itself – as they increasingly do – in being 
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highly regulated domestically. But what is the scope of isolated regulation 
in the midst of such intangible transactions? It is only in combination that 
the true purpose of the scheme comes to light. In fact, the sole objective of 
this multi- jurisdictional arrangement is to remove the location of the sale 
of a property from the location of the property itself, so as to avoid the 
sales tax in the original location of the property. It is difficult to see any 
other purpose to these arrangements.
The net results of these multi- jurisdictional schemes is that the brunt of 
property tax and stamp duties is borne by the worse- off and the middle 
classes, whereas the better- off and large corporations have the de facto 
privilege of avoiding them, if they so wish. These are, in other words, 
wealth concentration devices. Tax havens stand to benefit the most from 
this, in that they are in a position to design and create the legal loopholes 
for such schemes to their own advantage.
To take another example, in 2010 Luxembourg, under pressure from 
the EU, withdrew its 1929 Holding Company legislation. These types 
of holding companies were used pervasively for tax avoidance purposes 
because they were exempt from corporate income tax and could withhold 
tax on dividends and certain other Luxembourgian tax. As the backbone 
of many corporate tax minimization techniques, they had come in for 
widespread condemnation. On the face of it, Luxembourg appeared to 
have bowed to criticisms by terminating the 1929 Holding Company leg-
islation. In reality, in anticipation of the withdrawal, Luxembourg had 
already established a number of new structures to replace it. Among them 
are the Private Asset Management Companies (SPFs) introduced in 2007. 
The Luxembourg Consulting Group helpfully lists the tax liabilities of 
these types of companies as follows:
● a one- off registration tax of €75 that is payable at the formation of 
an SPF and when the articles of association are amended;
● subscription tax of 0.25 per cent annually on the deposited capital 
(1 issuing bonuses);
● no DBA authorization; (database authorization, i.e., data provided 
by the company is taken at face value);
● no VAT registration;
● complete exemption from corporate income tax, excise tax, and 
assets tax;
● no withholding tax on interest payments (restrictions apply to 
individuals);
● no withholding tax on dividend payments (non- residents);
● no taxation of capital profit arising from the sale of SPF shares 
(non- residents);
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● no taxation of liquidation revenues from the SPF (non- residents) 
(Luxembourg Consulting Group, 2014).
One can see how SPFs can support what the same document, perhaps 
unadvisedly, refers to as ‘opportunistic real estate investment’. The spe-
cific recommendation of the Luxembourg Consulting Group is for indi-
viduals and companies to set up SPFs ‘just in case’. SPFs are considered 
legal and above board. Indeed, Luxembourg is considered a highly regu-
lated financial environment. But it is difficult to deny that SPFs, and a few 
other provisions like it, are intended to perpetrate tax avoidance schemes 
routed through Luxembourg.
The scenario presented above also tells us that the data on assets reg-
istered offshore are highly dubious for two related reasons. First, there is 
no inherent reason why any of the holding companies, of whatever type 
or denomination, should revise asset values as they rise and fall. In the 
case of the Luxembourg SPFs, which is rather typical, there is an implicit 
promise on the part of the Luxembourg authorities not to relinquish 
the data provided by the SPFs to the national authorities. Most likely, 
declared asset values in such entities count as business propositions, and 
may be subject to considerations of taxation, leverage, collaterals and the 
like. Second, it is unclear whether there is any occurrence of double, triple 
or quadruple accounting, as some assets are linked together in chains of 
ownership spanning different jurisdictions. Each of these jurisdictions is 
keen to boast the aggregate value of all the registered assets. Indeed, the 
practice is to create at least one or two additional shell companies in dif-
ferent locations, ‘just in case’ a future sale scenario would benefit from a 
slightly different organization of the chain.
The Firm and Tax Havens
The intangible dimension of wealth is expressed to the fullest in the 
context of business companies. A surprising amount of business assets fall 
under the rubric of goodwill, and companies take full advantage of this 
flexibility for tax minimization purposes. Let us start with some clarifica-
tion about the nature of the firm and corporations. Dominant theories 
of the firm, as summed up by Jean- Philippe Robé, ‘are built around the 
notions of agency, property rights and contracts. . . Firms are assumed 
to be operating within perfect legal and political environments [where] all 
externalities within the firms’ production prices [and] all interests affected 
by the firm’s activities’ are internalized and protected’ (2011, p. 2). This 
view, however, tends to conflate the ownership structures of assets (the 
capital) with institutions (such as multinational corporations), and legal 
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institutions (corporations) with economic units (firms). The corporation 
is a legal entity that is licensed by a sovereign entity and can only operate 
within the bounds of one national space at a time.7 The firm, in contrast, is 
an economic entity. Firms often control strings of legal entities or corpora-
tions – at times numbering in the thousands – and in that sense can operate 
in many jurisdictions. The firm, on the other hand, lacks legal existence. 
In other words, legally speaking, there is no such thing as a ‘multinational 
corporation’.
In this context, tax minimization techniques exploit the differences 
between the economic control of firms and the legal foundations of ter-
ritorially bounded companies. All legal companies are bound by national 
rules and regulations that, if duly observed, are sufficient to raise compa-
nies above legal suspicions, as in the case of Luxembourg’s SPFs described 
above. Firms, on the other hand, are organizations put together by 
accountants, such as the Big Four accounting firms (Deloitte, PwC, Ernst 
and Young, KPMG). They typically span a number of territories and are 
used to link companies from different jurisdictions in such a way as to 
minimize their overall tax footprint.
A STORY OF RUSSIAN DOLLS
A telling example of firms’ tax minimization techniques was revealed in 
2012 by Emily Yiolitis, partner at Harneys, Cyprus. In her piece, Yiolitis 
describes a deal organized by her firm for a proposed US$500 million 
restructuring of a Russian individual shareholding with the view ‘of max-
imising the tax efficiency of the corporate structure and with a view to a 
prospective sale of part of the operations’ (Yiolitis, 2012). Harneys pro-
posed the following steps:
● Step one: The Russian company (RI) sets up a Cypriot holding 
company (CY). The company can only access the double tax treaty 
network with Cyprus as a local tax resident, so they shift manage-
ment and control to the island by setting up an office in Limassol, 
where they move three Russian representatives and hire two admin-
istrative staff.
● Step two: The Russian shareholder contributes 100 per cent of the 
shares of their Russian corporation (RusCo) to the CY in return for 
further shares in CY. The exchange of shares is carried out with no 
tax implication as such qualifying reorganizations are exempt from 
stamp duty (otherwise applicable at 0.2 per cent per cent of the value 
of the transaction). As a result, RI becomes the shareholder of an 
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increased number of shares in CY, and CY becomes the shareholder 
of RusCo.
● Step Three: Profits derived by the manufacturing operations of 
RusCo are sent as dividends to the sole shareholder, CY.
The double tax treaty between Cyprus and Russia stipulates that the divi-
dends payable from Russia to Cyprus are subject to 5 per cent withholding 
tax in Russia provided the investment exceeds €100 000. As RusCo was 
engaged in active manufacturing operations, CY, according to Cyprus 
law, was not subject to any tax in Cyprus. Hence, Cyprus did not levy 
any withholding tax on CY. Cyprus income tax law provides for a tax 
exemption from profits realized by Cyprus companies upon the sale of 
securities. Therefore the sale by CY of 30 per cent of its shares in RusCo 
to a purchaser situated in the British Virgin Islands (BVI) did not attract 
any income tax in Cyprus as a trading gain. As Cyprus does not tax capital 
gains, there was no incidence of capital gains tax in the sale of 30 per cent 
of RusCo by CY.
Here we have a case of a deal that operates through three different juris-
dictions, taking advantage of tax loopholes in each to ensure that only the 
minimal amount of tax is paid. Cyprus is therefore used by the Russian 
individual to minimize his tax footprint in Russia.
WHEN APPLES FALL FAR FROM THE TREE
Another common way a firm’s intangible assets can be exploited for tax 
minimization purposes is by recourse to the futurity value of those intan-
gibles formally recognized in English Common Law as ‘goodwill’. These 
include all the usual business assets that are valued on the basis of the 
firm’s future earning capacity, such as trademarks and brand names as 
well as the organizational and managerial business structure.
One way firms can utilize these assets in multi- jurisdictional tax minimi-
zation schemes is by separating the tangible sources of income, such as the 
sale of hardware, from the intangible sources of income embedded therein, 
such as the sale of patent rights or intellectual property rights associated 
with the hardware. The different sources of income can be subsequently 
apportioned to different companies. A large company of the size of BMW, 
for example, could hypothetically set up a string of offshore entities, each 
with a claim to different portions of a car: one owning the rights of income 
from the use of the label, another owning the rights of income from the 
sale of physical assets, and yet another owning the rights of income from 
the patents embedded in the cars. In this model, BMW car sales would 
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have to pay royalties to each of those separate companies. Since they 
are legally separated, they are each treated as separate entities for tax 
purposes. Needless to say, those companies will be registered in different 
jurisdictions, chosen largely for tax purposes.
Let us take the example of Apple Inc. The following is taken from a 
detailed study of the Levin Congressional Committee (Apple, 2013; The 
Permanent Subcomittee on Investigations, 2013). It appears that Apple 
Inc. has created three offshore corporations that receive tens of billions 
of dollars in income, but which have no tax residence – neither in Ireland, 
where they are incorporated, nor in the USA, where the Apple executives 
who run them are located. ‘Apple has arranged matters so that it can claim 
that these ghost companies, for tax purposes, exist nowhere. One has paid 
no corporate income tax to any nation for the last 5 years; another pays 
tax to Ireland equivalent to a tiny fraction of 1 per cent of its total income’ 
(The Permanent Subcomittee on Investigations, 2013, p. 3).
One of Apple’s shell companies is Apple Operations International 
(AOI). AOI directly or indirectly owns most of Apple’s other offshore 
entities. Under Irish law, only companies that are managed and controlled 
in Ireland are considered residents for tax purposes. Since AOI is only 
incorporated, but not managed or controlled, in Ireland it does not count 
as an Irish tax resident. Under US law, on the other hand, a company 
is generally taxed on the basis of where it is incorporated, not where it is 
managed and controlled. Since AOI is not incorporated in the USA, it is 
not tax resident in the USA either. AOI, therefore, is tax resident nowhere. 
In fact, AOI has as many as zero employees.
The second corporate shell set up by Apple in Ireland is Apple Sales 
International (ASI). ASI holds the economic rights to Apple intellectual 
property rights outside of the USA. From 2009 to 2012, its sales income 
amounted to US$74 billion. Similarly to AOI, the company is incorporated 
in Ireland but operated from the USA. ASI only paid a minimal amount of 
tax to Ireland. For example, in 2011 it paid US$10 million against US$22 
billion in revenue. Apple’s third subsidiary, Apple Operations Europe 
(AOE), sits between ASI and AOI. It, too, has no tax home.
Not unlike many firms of its kind, Apple is taking advantage, in other 
words, of discrepancies in incorporation and tax residency rules between 
different countries. Compared with more sophisticated techniques used 
by other household name firms, this is one of the simplest schemes of 
tax minimization, but one that makes full use of multi- jurisdictional tax 
 arbitrage. Needless to say, it is all legal.
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TROUBLESOME TAX HAVENS: AGGLOMERATIONS 
AND NICHE- SEEKING STRATEGIES
The cases mentioned above offer a flavour of how multi- jurisdictionality 
works in practise. It is a world that relies heavily on financial services, the 
Big Four accounting firms, as well as a myriad smaller law, banking and 
financial firms. A UK parliamentary committee estimates that this indus-
try generates about US$25 billion of annual income (House of Commons, 
2013).
One interesting question that arises from this discussion is whether 
those countries colloquially known as tax havens are actively encouraging 
the development of tax avoidance strategies or whether they have devel-
oped their own taxation rules independently and are just being exploited 
by scrupulous accounting firms. There are two possible answers to this 
question. One is based on the theory of the captured state or captured 
elites. This theory suggests that lacking the necessary manpower and ter-
tiary education facilities, many small island jurisdictions and their govern-
ments are not capable of developing successful offshore financial centres 
(OFCs) on their own. They are effectively ‘captured’ by powerful foreign 
finance and legal firms who write the laws of these countries that they then 
exploit. There is good evidence to this effect (Sagar et al., 2012). The other 
theory suggests that tax havens evolved in jurisdictions that were tradi-
tionally outward looking and dominated by commercial and trading inter-
ests. Many tax havens, such as Switzerland or Singapore, were originally 
known as entrepôt centres for regional trading activities. Their local elites 
were therefore strongly predisposed to develop OFCs.8 The two theories 
are not incompatible. Indeed, the second may add nuance to the first.
The latter theory points to the historical evolution of two broad types 
of tax haven agglomerations. This argument is founded on an analysis of 
the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) locational statistics on inter-
national lending and borrowing data (BIS, 2014). The data reveal that one 
agglomeration of tax havens has a distinct British imperial flavour. It con-
sists, first and foremost, of the City of London, and includes, in addition, 
the British Crown dependencies of Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man; a 
few British Overseas Territories, including the Cayman Islands, Bermuda, 
British Virgin Islands, Turks and Caicos, and Gibraltar; and recently inde-
pendent British colonies such as Hong Kong, Singapore, the Bahamas, 
Cyprus, Bahrain and Dubai.9 The British imperial pole accounted for a 
combined average of 38.3 per cent of all outstanding international loans 
and deposits by March 2010.
The other, far looser agglomeration consists of a string of mid- size 
Western European states known for an odd coupling of welfare and 
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tax haven provisions. They include the Benelux countries, Belgium, 
Netherlands and Luxembourg, as well as Ireland and Switzerland. The 
European agglomeration accounted for a combined 14.9 per cent of all 
outstanding international loans and deposits by March 2010, exactly the 
same as the entire USA (BIS, 2014).10
What explains the emergence of these two agglomerations of interna-
tional financial centres? Why do so many of the world’s leading interna-
tional financial centres have a British imperial link? The root cause behind 
this differentiation is found in the distinction, operated since the legal 
establishment of futurity valuation in the late nineteenth century, between 
two types of incorporeal properties, financial instruments and goodwill 
instruments (or intangibles).
London’s rise took place in the midst of the City’s attempt to survive 
the period of imperial decline. The tax haven agglomeration linked to 
it evolved as a group of centres designed to trade in incorporeal assets 
and therefore geared to operate as one gigantic offshore financial centre 
with the City of London at its core. The subsequent re- emergence of the 
City of London as the world’s premier financial centre was in no small 
part due to the emergence of the Euromarket in London in 1957 (Burn, 
2006). According to this theory, the Bank of England came to an informal 
agreement with London merchant banks that it would treat certain types 
of financial transactions, those between non- resident parties and those 
denominated in foreign currencies, as if they did not take place in London. 
In doing so, the bank effectively created a new regulatory space outside of 
its own jurisdiction – as well as a new concept, that of offshore finance. 
As the transactions taking place in London were deemed by the Bank of 
England to be taking place elsewhere, they ended up under no regulation 
at all, and therefore ‘offshore’. This new, unregulated locus of transaction 
came to be known as the Euromarket, or offshore financial market (Burn, 
2006).
The Euromarket remained small and practically unknown for three or 
four years until American banks discovered it in the early 1960s. They 
quickly developed branch networks so that they could avoid restrictive 
domestic regulations through their London subsidiaries. Once the facili-
ties of the Euromarket were discovered, corporate clients also began to 
bypass the banks and to tap directly into the offshore financial market 
to earn higher rates of interest while their clients, too, learnt to tap in the 
Euromarket to fund their operations (Sylla, 2002; Burn, 2006).
London emerged as an offshore financial market as a result of what 
could be seen as an administrative accident. All other areas under the juris-
diction of the UK at the time, including Hong Kong, the Channel Islands, 
the Cayman Islands and other British Caribbean Islands,  happened to 
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enjoy the same legal provisions, and spontaneously developed as offshore 
centres as a result. It did not take long, of course, for banks and other 
financial institutions to appreciate the useful synergies between tax havens 
and OFCs, particularly if located in the same place. In dual- status tax 
havens/OFCs, banks and other financial institutions could not only cir-
cumvent stringent financial regulations, but also find ‘tax neutral’ ways of 
conducting their business. This is in fact what drove some tax havens to 
develop as OFCs.
Some smaller US and Canadian banks, faced with the high infra-
structural costs of a London base, ‘realized that the Caribbean OFCs 
offered a cheaper and equally attractive regulatory environment – free of 
exchange controls, reserve requirements and interest rate ceilings, and in 
the same time zone as New York’ (Hudson, 1998, p. 541). According to 
various reports (Sylla, 2002), the early spillover of OFCs activities into 
the Bahamas and Cayman was motivated, like the London Euromarket, 
not by tax advantages, but by the cheaper transaction costs of setting up 
branches there.
The London Euromarket, while effectively unregulated, was still heavily 
taxed. However, as tax was levied at point of maturation, it became 
common practice to register syndicated loans and, later on, many other 
financial activities in commensurate offshore centres in British dependen-
cies (although for reasons that go beyond the scope of this chapter, until 
1974, Euromarket operations could develop only in British overseas terri-
tories and not in the three Channel Islands). Due to its historical roots, the 
British imperial pole of tax havens came to specialize in financial affairs, 
such as syndicated loans, derivatives, forex, insurance hedge funds and 
‘off the shelf’ companies.
The European agglomeration, on the other hand, preceded the British 
one. A recent study by Christophe Farquet (2013) demonstrates that 
concerns over Swiss and Belgian support of tax avoidance and evasion 
strategies were already expressed in the 1920s, and then extended to 
Luxembourg in the 1930s. European centres, primarily the Benelux 
countries and Ireland, and to a lesser extent Switzerland, emerged as tax 
havens for international capital harvested from intangible assets. They 
developed rules and regulations aimed at attracting holding companies 
that serve as repositories of international incomes from logos, goodwill, 
trademarks and brand names. Analysis of German inbound and outbound 
foreign direct investment (FDI), for instance, shows that the Netherlands 
and Switzerland serves as the two leading conduit jurisdictions for most 
German businesses over the past 20 years (Weichenrieder and Mintz, 
2007). The study also found that, typically for cases of this type, British- 
linked tax havens, such as Barbados, Bermuda and the Caymans, played 
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no significant role in hosting German conduit entities. Whatever their 
different historical origins, the Imperial and European agglomerations 
combined accounted, by March 2010, for approximately 53.3 per cent of 
all international banking assets and liabilities.
CONCLUSION
Tax footprint reduction makes business sense. Businesses, as economists 
are fond of repeating, are by their nature profit oriented. What plain eco-
nomic accounts tend to overlook, however, is the extent to which profit 
orientation varies along two conceptual and logistical boundaries: profit 
before and after taxes, and profit within and without national borders. 
Cross- border differences in tax structures incentivize the proliferation 
of tax arbitration schemes that push well beyond the legal and economic 
boundaries of profit orientation and wealth accumulation as traditionally 
understood.
Corporate tax footprint reduction makes wealth accumulation trou-
blesome on two fronts. On the one hand, tax minimization schemes 
hinge on the legal dismemberment of corporate entities into ecologies 
of ancillary businesses operating in multiple jurisdictions. This scale of 
multi- jurisdictionality, insofar as it clouds both actors and processes, is 
apt to provide cover for transactions of all but indiscernible legality. On 
the other hand, multi- jurisdictional arbitrage takes full advantage of tax 
reduction schemes directed not just at traditional notions of wealth, but 
also at intangible aspects of wealth, such as goodwill, that are treated 
as claims on future income streams. When multi- jurisdictional arbitrage 
operates on assets with such futurity value, the practice of tax minimi-
zation no longer involves just the protection of accumulated wealth, or 
wealth- already- accumulated, but also the process of accumulating wealth, 
or wealth- to- be- accumulated. Corporate restructuring practices aimed 
at the multi- jurisdictional arbitrage of capital gains tax, stamp duties or 
income tax all play on this troublingly elusive principle.
At the service of the huge cross- border traffic of capital resulting from 
this process of wealth accumulation is a global industry whose explicit 
purpose and product is the reduction of individual and corporate tax 
footprint. Emerged through an organic process of agglomerations and 
competitive niche- seeking strategies, tax havens have an estimated turn-
over of US$50 billion as well as around 10–12 per cent of global aggregate 
wealth parked within their shores. It is certainly not wealth per se, but the 
unaccountable generation and accumulation of wealth across these tax 
jurisdictions that spells most trouble.
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NOTES
 1. ‘BP’, the official name of the company since 2001, was short for ‘British Petroleum’ 
(The Economist, 2010; BP, 2014).
 2. See Beaverstock and Hall, Chapter 20 in this volume for further discussion.
 3. Notable exceptions include the likes of Tony Atkinson, Joseph Stiglitz, Emmanuel Saez 
and Thomas Piketty, who have led the vanguard of economic analyses of wealth accu-
mulation, particularly in connection with inequality (Atkinson, 2000; Piketty and Saez, 
2003; Atkinson and Piketty, 2007; Stiglitz et al., 2010).
 4. Most forecasts hover between a 2 per cent and a 3 per cent rise (United Nations, 2013; 
World Bank, 2014).
 5. For a discussion of celebrity goodwill, see Walzer and Gabrielson (1986).
 6. This is driving lively discussions in specialist law journals on the subject (see Walzer and 
Gabrielson, 1986; Kelly, 1999; Bartow, 2001).
 7. ‘Corporations are apart among the legal instruments used to legally structure firms. 
The reason for this is that they are treated by the legal systems as if they were “real” 
persons (with some adaptations), i.e. they can participate in the legal systems through 
the phenomenon of “juridical personality”. They can own property, have debts, con-
tract, sue and be sued in courts, get bankrupt, etc. – i.e. they can “function” in the 
economy like human beings because they are treated by the legal system as if they were 
“persons”’ (Robé, 2011, p. 9).
 8. See Beaverstock and Hall, Chapter 20 in this volume.
 9. Bermuda, the largest captive insurance centre in the world in spite of its relatively small 
banking centre, can be included too, and so can Cyprus and the numerous but less sig-
nificant former British colonies in the Pacific. For a discussion of Bermuda’s financial 
centre, see Crombie (2008). For a discussion of the Pacific offshore centres and their 
relationship to the UK, see Sharman and Mistry (2008).
10. The USA, in contrast, accounted for 12.4 per cent and 12.9 per cent of all outstand-
ing international loans and deposits, while Japan accounted for 4.5 per cent and 
3.8 per cent respectively in March 2009. The European havens were about 2 per cent 
higher only a year before. The USA appears to be the only large net gainer during the 
crisis of 2007 up to this day.
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